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Nokia: An ‘Old’ Company in a ‘New’ Economy 
by Sverker Alänge and Pascal Miconnet 
Chalmers University of Technology - Industrial Dynamics Dept.- 41296 Göteborg - Sweden. 
Background and Purpose of the Study 
At the Strategic Management Society Conference in Orlando in 1998, one company 
presentation stood out—the presentation by Pekka Ala-Pietilä, then head of the mobile phone 
division of Nokia 1, the Finnish giant on the cellular telephone market. He started out telling 
that for Nokia the resource-based view of strategy was too slow and historic, and that the 
market-based view takes the market for given, although all experience gained at Nokia shows 
that it has always been impossible to make correct predictions. Instead he emphasized time, 
both as speed and timing, and the need of considering the ‘whats’ and the ‘hows’ 
simultaneously. We heard him talk about experimenting and fast decision making, as well as 
about soft concepts such as learning and culture, and ending up by proposing that “culture is 
our strategy”. And the impression we got was that this was real – not only those things that 
high level executives say without really meaning it, or even understanding it to the full 
extent. Still we wondered, is it really the way it is, or is this only the way it is perceived from 
the top management horizon? Through the assistance of Pekka Ala-Pietilä, we had the 
advantage to have his co-writer of the Orlando presentation, Matias Impivaara, visiting our 
university to present the Nokia approach to strategy for the students in a course in strategic 
company development. Still amazed by the freshness and vigor of the strategy approach of 
Nokia in light of the impressive continued market development, we decided to conduct a 
study of to what extent this inside top management view of Nokia also is shared by other 
employees in the organization. This article reports from the first phase of this study and is 
based on interviews with Nokia employees at the Nokia headquarter in Espoo. The 
employees interviewed represent different areas connected to new product development, new 
business development, and logistics. We also included non-Finnish Nokia employees 
working in Finland, e.g. from the U.S. and Malaysia, in order to highlight some of the 
characteristics that stands out for persons coming from another cultural background. In short, 
the basis for this article is the inside analysis of the characteristic of the Nokia approach to 
strategy, originally developed by Pekka Ali-Pietälä and Matias Impivaara for the Strategic 
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Management Society Conference in Orlando in 1998, supplemented through a series of 
interviews and discussions with Matias Impivaara during 1999-2000 and Nokia employees in 
Espoo in September 2000.  
Sustained Company Development 
In the U.S. it has been found that the set of leading firms is rapidly replaced or strongly 
modified when new evasive technology and business models are being introduced. In fact, 
also in a European setting, when business conditions change, the most successful companies 
are often not able to sustain their market position. 2 It has been pointed out that the 
paradoxical pattern that winners become losers is a worldwide phenomenon. 3 Still, when 
looking around at the international business arena, there are companies that have been able to 
transform and renew themselves over a longer period of time. This includes those firms 
which successfully have been able to handle discontinuities introduced when technological 
innovation creates totally new markets or fulfill needs in new ways. 
According to Christensen (2000), “Most new technologies […] improve the performance of 
established products, along the dimensions of performance that mainstream customers in 
major markets have historically valued.”4 These ‘sustaining technologies’ are being 
contrasted to the ‘disruptive technologies’, which only emerge occasionally. Disruptive 
technologies are generally simpler, cheaper and lower performing, and they generally 
promise lower margins, not higher profits. Also, leading firms’ most profitable customers 
generally can't use them and don't want them, and they are first commercialized in emerging 
or insignificant markets. In the near-term, disruptive technologies result in worse product 
performance, but according to Christensen, these technologies are one factor leading to firms’ 
failures. He provides four main reasons for why large ‘well managed’ companies have an 
inclination of failing because of disruptive technologies: 1) Companies depend on customers 
and investors for resources and hence, they tend to develop systems for killing ideas that their 
customers don’t want. 2) Small markets don't solve the growth need of large companies. 3) 
Markets that do not exist cannot be analyzed. 4) Technology supply may not equal market 
demand. The leading firms who fail to change in Christensen's study are the ones that are 
‘well managed’ and carefully listens to their customers, and dur ing the 'sustaining technology' 
period they do very well. They typically also are aware of new technological development 
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and possible threats but they are unable to act forcefully, because they are ‘well managed’. 
Leonard-Barton (1995) provides a complementary framework to explain a company’s failure, 
focusing on a company's core technological capabilities. She defines the core technological 
capabilities as four interdependent elements: the physical system, the managerial system, the 
employees’ knowledge and skills, and the values and norms. They have been built over time 
and are not easily imitated. However, core capabilities typically also end up being the reason 
for loosing the competitive edge, because what was a strength at one point in time turns into 
core rigidities, when business conditions are changing. Hence, Leonard-Barton suggests a set 
of activities managers may use in order to challenge static thinking.5  
Regarding sustained company development and the need for firms to be able to continuously 
renew themselves, some scholars have focused on the specific needs of the high tech firms in 
rapidly changing markets. These firms need to cope with a complex business setting, with 
demands on timing and flexibility and on a continuous creation and exploitation of new 
business opportunities in order to grow. In this fluid and complex market, companies are 
looking for ways of creating some kind of stability or platforms, in order to simultaneously be 
able to deal with fluctuations/change and temporary windows of opportunity. Brown & 
Eisenhardt (1998) empirically demonstrate different approaches that high- tech companies 
have used in the 1990s to create stability and efficiency, including time pacing and patching. 
In a recent article, Eisenhardt & Sull (2001) takes one step further and claims that “…the new 
economy's most profound strategic implication is that companies must capture unanticipated, 
fleeting opportunities in order to succeed.” They conceptualize strategy as a set of ‘simples 
rules’, where the focus on key strategic processes (rather than position or competence) and a 
limited number of rules (rather than elaborated strategies) which provide “just enough 
structure” and direction for employees to operate in a chaotic environment, while leaving 
them enough freedom to quickly enough capture the best business opportunities6.  
Also, sustainable development is about managing paradoxes. A main paradox for most firms 
is to balance efficiency and innovation. As expressed by Magnusson (2000), “the 
understanding that the processes of knowledge creation and exploitation are mutually 
constitutive and closely interdependent leads us to consider the tension between innovation 
and efficiency as a duality that needs to be kept alive and continuously managed, rather than 
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being eliminated and resolved.”7 This is further emphasized by Tushman & O’Reilly (1997), 
who claim that the success of organizations depends on their managers’ ability to “juggle” 
with different organizational ‘architectures’ – i.e. simultaneously managing both efficiency 
and innovation. However, a successful organization may become dynamically conservative, 
i.e. a system-wide resistance to change, structural and cultural, preventing an organization 
from renewing itself.  
Culture (i.e. Nokia’s perspective on strategy) is in itself a paradox. It is a key to competitive 
advantage, but it is also very difficult to change. The question is then to understand how a 
culture can support both efficiency and innovation? Management literature does not say much 
about how culture can support or hinder a company’s renewal and action in fluid markets. In 
an organization, culture is best understood as a normative control system (Kunda, 1992). In 
complex work situations, when the outcome of the work is hard to measure, culture can be a 
most efficient mean of control. Innovation involves risk-taking and non-standard solutions, 
which is difficult to manage through formal control systems. Tushman & O’Reilly (1997) 
propose that a shared vision providing a sense of psychological attachment together with a 
cultural/social control system appears to be essential in rapidly changing environments. In 
Tushman & O’Reilly, culture is understood as the informal organization, i.e. informal 
communication patterns and informal power distribution in combination with norms and 
values. This informal organization is an emergent social construct, and emergent norms and 
values define the organization culture. 
To be sustainable, literature proposes that leading organizations must be able to cope with 
disruptive changes, must understand the nature of their core capability and nurture them (and 
the rigidity they can create when business conditions are changing) and to “juggle” between 
different organizational architecture to simultaneously manage efficiency and innovation. 
Fluid environments put particular pressure on firms to renew themselves and to question 
traditional approaches to strategy, since high degrees of unpredictability and uncertainty put 
particular demands on firms to be able to quickly react to unexpected opportunities. Culture 
is proposed by some management scholars as a potential key to manage in fast changing 
environment, and is also emphasized in Nokia’s approach to strategy. Against this frame of 
reference, the next section briefly discusses the ways Nokia has been able to be successful 
until now and raises a number of issues for its future sustainability.  
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Nokia – a Brief History 
One spectacular example of an old firm succeeding to transform itself in the ‘new economy’ 
is the Finnish telecom giant Nokia, which is one of the highest valued European firms on the 
stock market and a global leader in the mobile terminal sales. The origin of Nokia is from 
1869,8 when the first paper mill was built in the little village of Nokia, and this company 
together with two other old firms, a rubber boots firm and cable manufacturer, merged in 
1967 to form the conglomerate Nokia. The cable firm had started a small electronics 
development unit, which was kept protected by the Nokia CEOs, i.e. from the top 
management perspective an example of “juggling”9. The entry into the product application 
area, radio telephones, was supported by Finland's favorable trade position on the nearby 
Soviet market. This market provided a ground for learning, initially with a product design not 
fully competitive on the world market. However, due to the risk of becoming dependent on 
the Soviet trade, Nokia made a strategic decision to focus on the global market. In 1977, Kari 
Kairamo took over as the CEO and his contribution to initiate Nokia’s transformation was 
important. He initiated ambitious internationalization and education programs for Nokia 
employees. One long-term employee comments: “Everything we did was new. Organizations 
and work models were developed through improvising. There were no old networks or old 
traditions that hampered the development.”10 During Kairamo’s time as the top leader, Nokia 
diversified and invested heavily into the consumer electronics industry. However, the 
acquisitions of major European TV-manufacturers brought Nokia very close to bankruptcy in 
early 1990s. Under Kairamo a new group of leaders grew, including the present CEO and 
chairman, Jorma Ollila, who joined Nokia in 1985 and became CEO in December 1992. In 
the present top executive group of Nokia, five out of nine worked under Kairamo. 
Under Jorma Ollila, Nokia made a decision in 1992 to focus on the digital cellular market and 
to divest from other traditional areas. The direct implication of this decision was also that in 
two years, 60% of Nokia’s personnel was replaced, a lot of young engineers were hired, and 
in 2000 the average age of Nokia employees was 30 years. This decision to focus on a 
specific growth market provides a basis, from which the further development of Nokia can be 
understood. This means that in the perspective of Christensen (2000), Nokia made a complete 
shift into a new pervasive and disruptive technology, and has since then been riding on the 
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tremendous and unanticipated growth of the markets opened up by this new technology. 11 
The focus of this article is on the dynamics that Nokia has created in order to continue its 
growth on this digital platform. 
Since this disruptive change, Nokia’s success has put Helsinki on the world-map. Its success 
story is pretty much linked to the one of the GSM digital standard, in which Nokia massively 
poured resources in 1988, while competitors such as Motorola were slower to take the full 
step. But can really Nokia’s success be explained by ‘big bets’ and its company culture? 
From the technology side, Kari Kairamo, Nokia’s former CEO, believed in 1988 that Nokia 
could become a global player in the consumer electronic business (which represented in 1987 
20% of Nokia’s net sales). The scope was la ter narrowed in 1989 to telecom 12, but Kairamo 
was not far from the truth. Since 1989, Nokia has been able to be early involved in the 
development of concurrent technologies for various markets, such as the first analog 
standards (AMPS), second generation digital standards (GSM, CDMA or TDMA), and is also 
presently one of the leaders in the development of third generation standards (3G). This is 
what Pekka Ala-Pietilä¾Nokia’s current president¾calls “selecting the right horses”13.  
Also, a remarkable aspect of Nokia’s strategy is its ability to create and nurture technology 
and market-based alliances. Already in 1989, Nokia got the first GSM network running by 
forming an alliance with two Finnish telecom operators. During the last three years Nokia has 
strengthen its cooperation with global players¾such as AT&T, Ericsson, IBM, Intel, Toshiba 
or Motorola¾for the development of the third generation (3G) hard-and software technology 
and standards14. Technology leadership, early market presence, and proactive behavior in 
shaping technological standards seem complemented by Nokia’s very strong brand image and 
its user friendly design (including both physical design and user interface), instead of a pure 
focus on technical features and size that exists in many of its competitors. 
 Nokia has also developed internal mechanisms for continuous growth and renewal. As 
presented by Matias Impivaara15, one of Nokia’s three business areas (together with Nokia 
Mobile Phone and Nokia Networks) is the Nokia New Venture Organization. This unit 
                                                                 
11 Motorola the then market leader, on the other hand, stayed longer with the analog technology because of their US market 
domination and close customer contacts in combination with the perceived inferiority of the products (e.g. in terms of bulkyness of 
the first and second generation digital terminals) created an inertia to change. 
12 By the end of 1987, mobile phones represent 7% (respectively 60% in 1998) and telecommunications 8% (respectively 33% in 
1998) of Nokia’s net sales.  
13 See Silberman, Steve (1999): “Just say Nokia”; Wired, September 1999.  
14 For more information, see http://www.nokia.com/press/nps_int_alliances.html. (last consulted: January 29th 2001) 
15 Presentation at Chalmers University of Technology (Göteborg, Sweden), May 5th 2000. 
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supports business ideas outside of Nokia’s core business, which can have their origin both 
within and outside Nokia, and facilitates internal and external venturing activities, e.g. 
through knowledge transfer from Nokia’s competence base or by injecting venture capital. 
According to our interviews, Nokia management seems to believe in venturing activities, 
which exist in parallel to regular acquisitions. The purpose of the venture activity is to make 
profit, but also to increase Nokia’s awareness of disruptive technology and business models, 
including to ‘challenge the Nokia way’, i.e. to prevent the organization to become rigid. 
Finally, Nokia seems also good at managing the innovation-efficiency paradox raised in the 
technology management literature16. After a logistic crisis in 1995 that cut the Nokia value 
stock by half, Nokia made major efforts to streamline global business processes, and Nokia 
mobile phone (Europe and Africa) won the European Quality Award 2000 (category large 
business), which rewards excellence in execution of business processes17. To sum up, the 
portfolio of strategic action taken by Nokia is wide and combines and integrates 
recommendations from various strategic management schools. It also seems that the company 
is able to ‘juggle’ with different organizational architectures to combine both efficiency and 
innovation. Should we then believe (or not) Pekka Ala-Pietilä when he explains that “culture 
is our strategy”?  
According to our interviews and Nokia’s presentations at the 1998 SMS conference and at 
Chalmers 1999-2000, it seems that Nokia’s management has a very good understanding of 
the limitations and the potential use of various strategy perspectives depending on the 
business conditions it faces. More important however, it also seems that Nokia’s management 
has a way of making their strategy process work, which suits the complex and highly 
uncertain environment in which it operates, and that this way does not seem yet to be fully 
understood in strategic management literature.18 When explaining that “culture is our 
strategy”, what Nokia’s president points out is that, when Nokia faces a high degree of 
uncertainty and when prediction is not possible, then adaptability, proactivity, 
responsiveness, speed and timing become key competitive factors. For Nokia, “strategy 
beyond uncertainty” becomes the capability of the company and its employees to quickly 
react to new opportunities. In such context, as evoked in the ’98 SMS presentation, Nokia's 
culture; the values and norms supplemented by an efficient decision-making system, are at 
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has been received by Xerox, Texas Instruments, TNT, BT Yellow Pages and SGS-Thomson. The assessment model used 
corresponds to the U.S. Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award.  
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the core of the company’s ability to seize unpredictable opportunities. This is confirmed by 
our interviews, but again, there is more than meet the eyes, and Nokia has consistently put in 
place a number of organizational mechanisms to support flexibility and adaptability, creating 
what we name a ‘stability for change’. For example, what is probably most striking to outside 
observers is Nokia’s flat hierarchy. Generally, Finns seems to distrust authority, which has 
been explained by earlier Swedish and Russian domination. Nokia’s management style 
emphasizes individual initiative, controlled improvisation, achievement, pragmatism, and 
decisions are taken “where the knowledge is”. This has also an impact on Nokia’s strategy 
processes: Given the uncertainty in consumer needs, markets or technologies, Nokia needs to 
continuously monitor its environment. The ones that contribute to the company strategy are 
the ones who have the most insights, i.e. often employees from lower levels who notice small 
but meaningful changes, which are fed back to top management through a bottom-up strategy 
process. This type of strategy process is what Nokia management calls “building guessing 
mechanism”. The decision-making process is also characterized by a preference for 
integrated and continuous small decisions with no possibility to go backwards, since “as in 
football game, everyone in the field is continuously moving, which continuously influence 
the strategy you choose”. This incremental decision-making philosophy is supported by a lot 
of testing internally. The lack of hierarchy also means that leaders at every level are very 
accessible and willing to listen, and that there are no “barriers or gatekeepers” to filter 
information and initiatives. The lack of hierarchy and the proactive behavior of employees is 
reinforced by the non-existence of a company organization chart. New employees have to 
create their own picture of the company, and their first task is to build a personal contact 
network, without which any initiative is impossible, “since you have to find the person that 
can give you the ‘go’, which differs in every case”. The building up of one’s personal 
network is also a main responsibility for every manager introducing a new employee, who 
have to make sure that the person has the right contacts to be able to do his/her job. In 
general, “information is not so much written, which mean that new employees learn to ask”. 
Another characteristic of the employee’s socialization process is that new employees are 
“thrown into the fire”, which mean that new comers are directly involved in projects with just 
enough guidance for them to perform their job, which again ensures that they must adopt a 
proactive behaviour in learning about their job and fulfilling their tasks. In addition, there is a 
strong pressure from top management for systematic job-rotation at all leadership levels 
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(every 2-3 years). This rotation appears to be a powerful way to increase employee’s 
competence and knowledge of the company, and it also prepares employees for change and 
prevents the emergence of hidden agendas and political inertia.  
Regarding Nokia’s culture, Nokia’s strength may not be in its company values—customer 
satisfaction, respect for individual, achievement and continuous learning, but more in the 
attitudes promoted by management and reinforced by the leaders visible behaviors. Among 
the important attitudes is the concept of ‘Nöyryys’, which can be interpreted as not being 
‘arrogant’, knowing that “you should never take things for granted, that nothing is given, and 
that even when you are successful, you have to remember it”. In Nöyryys is also the notion of 
focus, of “doing one thing at a time”. Nöyryys seems to be deeply rooted in Finnish small 
farm conditions, where people had to really “work hard to take away stones and cultivate”, 
and where weather conditions made the quality of the harvest very uncertain. It is a deep 
Finnish value, which has been reinforced by Finland’s recession in the 1990s, and it seems 
strong among Nokia’s ‘older employees’, while an attitude change is being noticed for 
younger employees, partly explained by the well-publicized success of some Finish IT based 
start-up companies in Finnish newspapers. Respect for the individual is also an attitude that 
Nokia’s employees mention as important, also noticing that this attitude is balancing with 
other attitudes and values. Status in Nokia is competence-based and employees seem free to 
openly criticize decision and test each other, which is “not easy to do” in a respectful way. In 
general—and what was also our ‘aha’ experience at Nokia’s presentation and during our 
interviews—Nokia’s culture is strongly reinforced by management behavior, “who live the 
values”.  
To conclude, to the question if we can believe Nokia’s president when he says that “culture is 
our strategy”, the answer is definitely YES. It is obvious that Nokia’s promoted values, 
attitudes and behaviors are an essential component of Nokia’s strategy to quickly and 
smoothly react to unexpected threats and opportunities. At the same time, Nokia has aligned a 
number of organizational mechanisms to support its culture.  The Nokia internal organization 
fosters innovative, adaptive behavior, and improvisation under certain rules, which fits the 
“organization as jazz-band” metaphor presented at the 1998 SMS conference. In a broader 
picture, Nokia’s strategic edge for sustainability seems to be the company capacity to 
combine and integrate known forms of strategic thinking (e.g. technology leadership, 
alliances, venturing activities etc.),with new intraorganizational strategic solution, which 
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seems essential for its survival in the complex and highly uncertain environment in which it 
operates. 
 
Conclusions  
History shows that becoming No.1 often has been the starting point to decline, and Nokia is 
not immune to this virus, even if the company earlier has shown an impressive ability to 
transform itself. What could be potential threats to Nokia? First, when Nokia more and more 
is becoming a global corporation, with international alliances and acquisitions and with 
employees from all over the world, the base for the values is no longer homogenous, and this 
may go counter to Nokia’s corporate culture, which seems deeply grounded in Finnish 
culture. Second, the only thing we know for sure is that there will continuously be disruptive 
changes at irregular intervals, driven by technological innovation or other major changes. In 
order to stay a top, Nokia has established many mechanisms for renewal, including 
intelligence and the new businesses organization. However, being a large corporation with a 
continued need for growth, there is a risk that these new potentially disruptive technologies 
will not be acted upon. The main reason being that when you are a large well managed firm, 
you are only interested in those new business opportunities which according to a market 
estimation result in a large revenues – i.e. in line with Christensen’s observation, the new and 
possibly initially inferior disruptive technologies may be left to someone who is more keen 
on starting small. 
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